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Abstract 
This paper explores the implications of Turkish labour migration for the human resources strategies of the European 
Union (EU). The key issues in the migration debate centre on globalization and the constant need for technological 
change (innovation), which gradually resulted in fundamental economic transformations. Each of these 
transformations has fundamental implications for nature of knowledge-driven economies. Impact of knowledge on 
economic growth is evident and crucial. Under the influence of globalization and information technologies, for most 
countries it became necessity to be competitive in the world market. This shift has probably increased the importance 
of human capital in the West, with complex and sometimes contradictory implications for public policy making. The 
industrial revolution has laid the foundation of transformation in term of sectoral structure. As a result, both processes 
and products have been revolutionized, adjusting the equation between capital and labour. The growth in the service 
sector has led to major jobs losses in manufacturing. Lack of skills in the face of continuing economic change is a 
Europe-wide phenomenon. According to the European Commission studies (2008), two thirds of business claimed 
that there was the lack of adequate skills in some sectors, such as engineering and construction. This suggests that the 
developed economies will continue to attract and exchange highly skilled workers. Essentially, labour shortages may 
occur in those industries that are growing, but specific skill shortages are likely to be universal, as new technologies 
and working practices outstrip existing educational and training provisions. The scale of any shortages seems to be 
affected by prevailing economic conditions. The questions are likely to be more deeply debated in the European 
context in coming years whether or not Turkish immigrants may compensate skills shortages. The central debate is to 
what extent Turkish workers undercut native workers and thus reduce the pressure on the European countries and 
firms to provide training and technology. 
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  1. Introduction 
      
 The Internal Market programme has opened the EU member states’ markets to increased competition 
and paved the way for efficiency-based growth. The key sectors, such as public procurement or services, 
market remain fragmented. European financial markets are not yet providing business and industry with 
the multiple sources of capital they need to complete in the modern rapidly changing, globalised 
economy. Moreover, the knowledge economy is changing the skills needed for work. More and more 
employers complain that they can not find people with the IT skills they require [1]. This uniquely 
complex and challenging situation creates incentives for importation of foreign workers, since the labour 
shortages occur. 
     
  Theoretically, the member states falling back employment-related migration seek flexibility, 
especially adaptability to the current labour needs. In the case of flexible labour markets, there is of 
course no unemployment. In the case of semi-rigid labour markets, the unemployment rate increases 
slightly in the receiving countries by between 0.1 and 0.2 percentage points depending on the skill 
composition of the migrant population. The higher the skill level of the migrant population, the lower the 
increase in the unemployment rate in the receiving countries [2]. Within the context of selective migration 
policies, the member states review their policies by seeking migrants with characteristics better adapted to 
the medium or long term needs of the labour market. This perception differs from past strategies that 
based on the temporary nature of employment-related migration.  
     
  There have have been major changes in the nature of demand and working practices. Acquiring the 
cheap labour has become the main features of industrial economy in the West. To what extent can 
employment-related migration policies, with the changes occurring in the labour market, be reconciled? 
How much can Turkey offer the old EU? Turkish workforce may be a solution to fundamental human 
resources problems in the host country, but not a cause of their problems. This is why it is important to 
have the facts straight and careful examinations and assessments of the impacts of Turkish labour 
migration on the European enterprises in the context of skill composition. After all, there should be type 
of potential output. 
      
 This study focuses on the main characteristics of Turkish human resources according to its sectoral 
employment, its labour productivity level, its current stock of human capital and its educational matching 
with labour market demand etc. The study makes use of statistical data from the European Commission, 
the OECD and World Bank as well as a number of independent studies in this field. It also makes use of 
other publicaitions from some of other insitiutions including the Turkish Employment Institution and the 
Turkish Ministry of Employment. The study relies on a number of basic facts and statistics, involving in 
analysis of scientific literature and statistical data on migration in terms of secondary sources. 
2.  Human Resources and the Growth Theory 
      
The importance of human capital has given a way to the emergence of the new endogenous growth 
theory. Human capital is increasingly viewed as an augmentation of basic human skills through education 
and training. Simply, this assumes an economy output equation. In this theory, it is postulated that human 
capital is inevitable for the creation of new knowledge pattern. As a result, a human capital will bring 
about economic growth, an assumption is dominantly based on new growth theory. The underlying 
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assumption is, of course, there is a need for imported human capital, which positively contributes to 
economic growth. At the same time,  this capital may produce positive externalities as well as spillovers 
in the host economy. 
     
  In principle, countries with a better endowment of human capital are considered to have a greater 
development potential than countries with scarce or inadequate human resources. Bassanini and Scarpeta 
investigated the role of accumulation of human capital on economic growth across twenty-one OECD 
countries in the period of 1971–98. Using an indicator of educational stock in the host countries. 
Bassanini and Scarpeta establised a long-term relationship between factor input and output. They 
concluded that human capital accumulation had a positive impact on output per capita growth.  Around 
6% was estimated as a long-term effect on output of one additional year of schooling.a An econometric 
analysis by Rodrıguez-Pose and Vilalta-Bufı (2005) reveals that, in the case of European regions, factors 
including the degree of job satisfaction, balance between the skills on offer and those demanded, and the 
capacity to attract highly skilled migrants seem to have a higher sway over economic performance than 
the measures of human capital stock, which are traditionally used as proxies for human capital in most 
growth analyses. The results indicate that stock variables are more likely to be associated with wealth, 
whereas job satisfaction, matching indicators and migration are more closely related to economic 
performance [3]. More specifically, a study by Martin and Lowell in the USA in 1991 demonstrated that 
the “New Americans” contributed a net $1–10 billion per year to US GDP in the mid-1990s.b The key to
these studies is that human capital has traditionally been one of the key factors behind the economic 
growth. 
     Overall, new growth theory highlights the importance of human resources for Economic growth. 
Subsequently, highly skilled migration can significantly contribute to the stock of human capital and thus 
to the economic growth of a specific country [4]. The phenomenon of highly – skilled workers movement 
is influenced by rapid progress of science and technology that generates a steady growth for highly – 
skilled labour force in the international labour market. Negative demographic changes with the ageing 
population in the advanced economies are other significant reasons to pull immigrant labour [5]. 
3.  Background: the Need for Turkish Migrants  
     
  The need for Turkish migrants became more obvious, reflecting upon the first German-Turkish 
bilateral agreement in 1961. The pattern of migration associated with one particular constellation of 
economic conditions in Germany, when its employers were facing problems with the country’s post-war 
reconstruction. So, sustained migration to the West began with the first bilateral agreement signed 
between Germany and Turkey in 1961. By the middle of 1960s other industrial countries in Europe 
(namely Austria, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland had passed special laws on 
migration. Since then, migration policies of these countries that have been shaped by domestic 
considerations attracted Turkish workers. This is to say, the demand side of Turkish labour migration was 
shaped largely by changing trends in demand in the European economies. 
       
      From the outset, however, it should be stressed that Turkish workers were desirable at a time of 
economies miracles in the early 1960s. The German demand for temporary migrant workers 
aA. Bassanini and S. Scarpetta (2001), Does Human Capital Matter for growth in OECD Countries? Evidence from Pooled   
Mean-Group      Estimates (OECD), op. cit. note 8 supra, 24.  
bS. Martin and L. B. Lowell (2004), Competing for Skills: US Immigration Policy Since 1990. Paper prepared for presentation at 
North American Integration: Migration, Trade and Security, http://www.irpp.org/events/archive/apr04/lowell.pdf. 
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(Gastarbeiter, or guest workers) was met by the provision of Turkish manpower, which was relatively 
skilled owing to Turkey’s economic and social reforms in the 1923-1960 period. Successive Turkish 
governments encouraged labour emigration starting with Turkey's first five-year development plan (1962-
1967). The export of excess unskilled labour to Europe would encourage return flow remittances and 
alleviate unemployment as well as the balance of payment difficulties in Turkey [6]. 
      An important consideration is that the employment of the Turkish workers had significantly 
positive economic consequences for the Western European countries, although their skill compositions 
were transformed over time. To this end, they could be regarded as qualified with respect to skill, training 
and age in construction, textiles and agriculture-realated sectors. The demand of young and skill workers 
– many of whom left Turkey for Western Europe at their most productive age – demonstrated that the 
Turks were too precious to employ. In order to prevent “brain drain”, the successive Turkish governments 
took some measures to avoid undesirable impacts as a result of a large migration in subsequent years. 
      By the first half of 1960s, Turkey became one of the largest sending countries. An in-depth inquiry 
into the pattern of migration trends in Turkey suggests that this new trend derived from gradually 
experienced serious rural to urban internal migration. Emigration followed on closely from the rural 
exodus to the big Turkish cities which were undergoing a process of rapid industrialisation [7]. Thus, this 
situation eventually led to international migration. The high level of unemployment, especially in the 
rural areas, appeared to have a drastic impact on willingness to emigrate to the West among the 
population. The growing number of peasants migrants had made it more difficult for urban areas to garner 
support.  
      In a situation close to full employment, and in spite of the first warning that came in 1968 with the 
onset of a recession, the 1961-1973 period was characterised by an increasing willingness to employ 
Turkish migrant workers and by a considerable extension of the migration field (made up of all the 
regions in which Turkish workers and their families settled) [8]. However, the 1973 oil price increase 
brought the end of employment-related migration. Growing unemployment and increasing social tensions 
prompted Western governments to stop active recruitment policies. In some countries, the recruitment of 
new workers was made more difficult for employers by increasing the costs of recruitment, limiting the 
categories of workers and introducing annual quotas. Governments also implemented policies with the 
aim of encouraging migrant workers to return to their home countries [9].  
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Figure 1. Annual inflows of Turkish workers to other countries, 1961-2008 
Source: Turkish Employment Institution 
       
      There is no doubt about continuing relevance of growing unemployment and increasing social 
tensions due to oil price increase, which prompted governments to stop active recruitment policies. There 
is nothing particularly surprising that – even after the halt to immigration – the EU’s demand for unskilled 
workers for employment has become more insistent. As illustrated in Figure 1 above, the 1973-1980 
period was characterised by a large increase in the number of the Turkish workers in Western European 
countries, despite many people returned home for good. Migrants hurried to bring over their families. 
      The Figure 1 also shows that, during the 1990s, there was still migration pressure. This is despite 
the fact that the number of Turkish flows steadily decreased in all six European countries. The 
considerable resurgence of migration pressures over 1990s had given rise to the complexity of the 
migration phenomenon that prevailed in the member states. Nonetheless, there was a shortfall in demand 
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for recruitment of foreign labour, which contributed to the size of the Turkish flows. The underlying issue 
was that the member states should limit the labour flow rate and harmonise the employment-related 
migration policies. Under these circumstanes, the divergent and legally complex national provisions put a 
break on the growth of the Turkish population in Germany in the period of 1997-1998, as the first notable 
decline was recorded in this period. 
      The globalization of the world economy and its labour market seems to impact on the current level 
of Turkish flows rate. Some of these countries, notably the UK, Germany and Spain are importing the 
unskilled foreign labour to fill the shortages, especially in construction, agriculture and health care 
system. The present of Turkish workers in Europe is significant, but some recruitment difficulties 
increased in the mid-2000s. For example, the net migration of Turkish workers in France had been 
positive in the period of 2000-2006, but they accounted for slightly less than 39% in 2008 on 2007. 
Generally, the small scale of migration in recent years is reflection of the EU’s selection policies in the 
post enlargement period. The member states now engage in migration systems that are producing an 
increasing diversity of flows. 
4.  Possible Impact of Turkish Labour Migration   
4.1 Skills Profiles  
      When announcing the goal for economic competitiveness at the Lisbon summit in 2007, European 
leaders signalled the creation of a “knowledge-based economy”. Abilities, skills and competence of 
human resources are the main factors for the development of knowledge based economy [10]. In this 
vein, the attractiveness of countries for the highly skilled is defined by ‘soft’ factors, such as the quality 
of the education system, a country’s attitude towards innovation and lastly, returns on skills. In relation to 
the first two factors, the attractiveness of a country to the highly skilled and the accomplishment of the 
Lisbon objectives are interconnected  [11]. 
      Considerable caution is especially required when interpreting skill composition of Turkish 
migrants across the EU member states. Bearing these caveats in mind, in most years over the past four 
decades, the EU had been host to mainly unskilled labour force from Turkey. According to the Turkish 
Employment Institution, 78% of those who migrated to the West in 1968 as a result of family unification 
were around the 25-39 age groups. This percentage was slighly less (76%) in 1978 for the same age 
group. 35% of immigrants aged 20 to 30 had completed the elementary education and over 63% at least 
had elementary school certificate in 1978. Following years witnessed a decreasing trends of education and 
skill levels of Turkish immigrants. In particular, specific skill shortages posed serious political challenges 
for Turkey. This is especially true when the progressive stages of free movement of Turkish labour could 
not take place. 
      In the post-enlargement period, the attempts should be made to present a wider picture of the issue 
of highly skilled Turkish migrants. Typically, a major cause of why the current Turkish migration flows 
have been on a small scale is the skill requirements by the EU member states. Most receiving countries 
have become more selective, actively seeking only skilled foreigners. Their need for mass immigration of 
guest worker programme) is gone and will not return. For the foreseeable future, organized labor 
movements, occurring with the consent of immigration authorities, will be principally of skilled workers. 
Their migrations will likely respond to specific shortages and they will be seen as essential to retain 
international competitiveness and increase productivity. Despite fundamental shifts in employment 
structures, some demand for low-skilled workers continues, however, mostly in labor intensive and low-
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paying service industries such as catering and cleaning [12]. A recent survey of 100 Turkish firms in 
Brussels illustrates that most of the entrepreneurs are young, below 35 years of age and that one-fifth are 
university graduates. Assuming that skill and education levels is rising in Turkey, the question is whether 
Turkish workers’ skills should be considered as complementing rather than substituating current current 
patern in the EU.   
       Historically, most workers from Turkey headed for low-paid, low-productivity jobs, most studies 
reveal that workers entering the European labour markets tend to be relatively well educated. Reliable 
data on the characteristics of Turkish migrants in the early decades are scarce. It is possible to get a sense 
of the overall some of the key characteristics of Turkish workers. The characteristics of arrivals tended to 
be different from other foreign national profiles. Typically, they were relatively young (median age 
roughly 30 years), male and were mostly low skilled. Ironically, as Murat pointed out, Turkish workers 
had higher skill levels than workers originared from other mediterranean countries, when Europe 
demanded workforce from abroad in the 1960s. This is based on the fact that the Turkish government 
supplied suitable skilled workforce, demanded by European Countries in the first years of immigration. 
To illustrate this point, the ratio of skilled workers coming from mediterranean countries was 29.9% in 
1965. The figure for the Turkish workers was 34.8% [13]. 
      According to Deutsche Bank research (2005), Turkey has made sizeable progress,  especially adult 
learning. The measurement of progress towards the increasing or settting up the number of vocational 
training centres, which are known as halke÷itim merkezleri, in country wide examplifies this claim. The 
aim is to integrate the unemployed of young and adult, who are caught in a vicious circle, into social 
development scheme with access to employment. Under the EU’s Acquis Communaiture new measures 
have been introduced in terms of more education and training programmes since 2005. Such measurs 
certainly contributed to the development of quality education by cooperation between Turkey and the EU 
through a variety of funding and action programmes (i.e., Erasmus). Consequently, vocational training 
programmes are now more common in Turkey than decades ago. One may assume that these programmes 
or schemes faciliates adaptation of Turkish workers to industrial changes in the West. 
      It is often claimed that highly-skilled workers have high degrees of education and the primary 
purpose of their jobs usually involve the creation or application of knowledge. As Table 1 shows,  in 2006 
the highest number of gradutes from tertiary education was recorded in Turkey, with the exception of 
Poland. The proportion of students found in tertiary education varied considerably betweens subjects and 
reflects, to some degree, the demographic structure of population. As the emphasis placed on field study, 
proportionally, more young Turkish people opted for enginering, manufacturing and construction (14.3%) 
than the population in most of CEECs. Interestingly, the percentage of those who studied social sciences, 
business and law was higher than the population in most the EU-15 member states. This may reflect the 
desire of some young Turks to obtain jobs as managers, financial analysts, consultants of special services, 
scientists, engineers, computer specialists, biotechnologists, etc.  
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Table 1. Graduates from tertiary education, by field of education, 2006 (1)  
Total number 
of graduates 
from tertiary 
education 
 of which, 
studying 
 (%) 1000 
Huma
nities 
ities  
& arts 
Social 
sciences, 
business 
&law 
Science, 
Math.& 
com-
puing 
Engin. 
Manuf.& 
con- 
struction 
Agricul. 
&vet- 
erinary 
Health  
&  
welfare    
Services 
EU-27 3,846 12.2 35.3 9.9 12.5 1.7 14.4 3.8 
Euro area 2,2113 12.9 33.8 10.2 14.3 1.8 15.2 4.3 
Belgium 82 9.8 28.3 7.7 9.3 2.3 18.9 2.1 
Bulgaria 45 8.4 47.8 5.3 15.6 2.0 6.2 7.7 
Czech Republic 69 75 28.7 7.6 15.0 3.6 12.4 5.6 
Denmark 48 13.8 30.4 7.2 10.9 2.1 23.8 3.3 
Germany 415 15.9 23.7 11.4 13.5 1.8 20.4 3.1 
Estonia 12 11.4 36.6 9.9 9.9 2.2 11.6 8.6 
Ireland 59 19.1 34.7 18.8 12.1 0.6 11.0 2.4 
Greece(2) 60 13.1 28.0 15.0 12.3 3.6 9.7 8.5 
Spain 286 9.2 28.3 10.0 16.5 1.8 14.2 7.6 
France 644 12.1 41.6 11.1 14.7 1.5 13.0 3.9 
Italy 279 17.0 38.7 6.8 15.9 1.7 12.4 2.6 
Cyprus 4 10.0 43.7 9.7 4.2 0.2 6.7 14.3 
Latvia 26 6.2 56.0 4.6 6.8 1.0 5.2 4.9 
Lithuania 43 6.7 40.9 5.9 15.9 1.8 9.0 3.5 
Luxembourg - - - - - - - - 
Hungary 70 7.6 43.8 5.8 6.7 2.6 8.8 8.8 
Malta 3 15.5 44.2 6.3 4.8 1.0 13.0 3.1 
Netherlands 117 8.2 38.2 6.8 8.3 1.5 16.5 4.5 
Austria 35 8.7 29.7 12.6 19.8 2.1 9.9 3.7 
Poland 504 8.7 42.6 8.5 8.4 1.6 7.8 5.0 
Portugal 72 10.3 32.2 11.3 15.1 1.8 24.2 7.2 
Romania 175 11.9 48.2 4.5 15.8 2.7 9.6 2.1 
Slovenia 17 5.1 49.6 3.5 12.6 2.4 9.9 7.7 
Slovakia 40 6.3 27.4 8.6 15.0 2.9 17.1 6.7 
Finland 40 13.5 23.4 8.7 20.7 2.3 19.1 6.0 
Sweden 61 6.1 24.8 8.1 18.4 1.0 25.3 2.2 
United Kingdom 640 15.4 30.5 13.4 8.2 0.9 18.3 0.8 
Croatia 21 9.4 39.4 6.3 11.5 3.6 8.9 13.5 
FYR of  Maced. 7 13.4 26.9 7.4 13.8 4.0 12.3 5.4 
Turkey 373 6.4 37.7 7.8 14.3 4.0 5.7 6.2 
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Iceland 3 11.2 34.1 8.0 6.4 0.7 11.7 1.4 
Leiechtenstein 0 3.0 54.5 0.0 34.8 0.0 7.6 0.0 
Norway 34 8.8 27.0 8.2 7.5 1.1 24.5 4.8 
Switzerland 69 6.5 39.4 10.3 12.1 1.6 11.0 6.7 
Japan 1,068 35.2 27.0 3.0 18.2 2.2 12.8 9.7 
United States 2,639 33.2 38.1 8.9 7.2 1.1 13.5 6.5 
Refer to the Internet metadata file (2) 2005.   
Source: Eurostat 
      The role of migration is related to the difficulty in measuring human capital, in general, and human 
capital mobility and the matching between educational supply and labour demand, in particular [14]. One 
should pay particular attention to the unequal conditions of education and employment of the sexes in 
Turkey. A particular problem is lower participation of women in education, especially in South(East) 
region. According to the Turkish Statistical Institution, less than 50% female participated in education in 
2006. Unsuprisingly, around 12,000 unemployed females were illiterate, despite female education 
attainment was generally higher than males. Another persistent problem is that female employment is 
considerably low in Turkey due to religious and cultural reasons. Another peace of evidence from a door 
to door survey by the Turkish Statistic Institution in 2001 showed that one of fourth of working 
population was women. Of that 70% employed in agricultural sector. In accordance with the current 
European labour market trends, some employers are looking for female workers, most notably in service 
and health care sectors. In this case, gender imbalances in Turkey may create a handicap for European 
integration process. Indeed, such imbalances throw a gloom over the prospect of Turkish womens’ 
employability. 
Table 2. World Bank education index*  
Korea 0.98 
CEE-3 0.94 
Bulgaria                    0.91 
Romania                   0.88 
Turkey                      0.80 
*) 1 = best 
       
      Actual migration flows indicate substantially different patterns of movement of migrants than these 
which would characterize shipments of capital good among spatially differentiated market. But if 
migration is indeed on investment process the patterns of human and physical capital should follow 
similar law [15]. Table 2 above presents human capital endowment between Turkey and emerging 
markets. It sets against Turkey’s human capital endowment. Although the situation is less favourable, it 
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can improve gradually. Phrase like “one university for each city” is deeply entrenched in Turkish 
government policy. In recent years 95 new universities have been established in Turkey adding up to 125 
in total– virtually one in each city. It is possible to suggest that highly skilled migration will significantly 
contribute to the stock of human capital, and thus to the economic growth of European countries, when 
younger and better educated workers enter the workforce.  
      Higher immigration rates may generate a greater incidence of highly motivated job seekers, but 
people qualified overseas may also be harder to match because of the non-transferability of country-
specific skills, lack of recognition for their foreign qualifications and language barriers [16]. In Germany, 
an estimated one third of the total Turkish speakers are under 18 years of age and more than 80 per cent 
of them have been educated in Europe [17].  Figure 2 shows that, despite the considerable progress, 
Turkey have relatively lower proportion of learning all three foreign languages (English, French and 
German) in comparison to the CEECs. Since the early 1980s foreign language learning – notably English 
– has seriously been taken in Turkey.  In addition to investing foreign language learning schemes that 
foster participation in schools, universities and adult education centres, the proportion of the Turkish 
pupil learning foreign languages should be increased in order to generate positive rates return to the 
economy. The current situation suggests that language barrier will stand on the way as to precluding 
Turkish migrants to integrate into the European labour markets. 
Figure 2. Proportion of pupils learning foreign languages in the secondary education by language, 2005 
(Estonia- cultural and linguistic barriers) 
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The emphasis of the majority of the studies on educational stock placed on the existent Turkish 
entrepreneurs in European countries. This points to the potential of Turkish self-employment in the EU 
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which should be added to above trends. Self-employment began as an alternative employment path for 
many first-generation redundant guestworkers but it also became a significant response by second-
generation youth, often assisted by parents who had in mind securing the future livelihoods of their 
children. An increasing number of entrepreneurs come from the ranks of the second generation, and the 
emerging literature on Turkish entrepreneurs points to rapid expansion across the generational spectrum. 
The overall proportion of the Turks, who are self-employed in the EU lies at 4.8 per cent, which is 
significantly below the EU average of 12.3 per cent [18].
4.2 Labour Market Participation 
      Labour market situation in receiving and sending countries is one of the most important economic 
factors behind migration decisions [19]. As one of the labour market trends, the unemployment rate. 
According to the Turkish Statistical Institution, unemployment rate rose to 14.0% in 2009 from 11.0% in 
2008. This is despite the fact that the unemployment rate in Turkey has been more or less static since 
2004, but hardly imroved in some rural areas. The official unemployment rate in rural areas is 70.0%. The 
high unemployment figures probably mirror the propensity to immigrate. This is to say, a lack of 
employment opportunities, or unemployment, or low earnings in Turkey are more likely to trigger 
migration. Having said so, Turkish workers may alleviate skills bottlenecks in the EU member states, 
while contributing to long-term growth through human capital accumulation. 
      As already mentioned, there is a growing shortages of skilled workers in the sector of information 
and communication technology. The gradual shift in Europe away from the primary sector and traditional 
manufacturing industries towards services and the knowledge-intensive economy is likely to continue 
[20]. This implies that there are lesser economic prospects for the unskilled. For this reason, the question 
of highly skill immigrants should be addressed urgently. However, although the developments of 
information and communication technology require skilled and highly-skilled labour there is still demand 
for unskill labour force. There is in fact a propensity towards an increase in employment-related 
migration, including unskilled foreign labour, especially in agriculture, building and public work and 
domestic services. It is reasonable to suggest that Turkish workers will the gaps that domestic workers are 
unable to fill.  
     The attention is given to the sectoral employment in Turkey. The trend is very different in the sense 
that agriculture looms large in the life of Turkish citizens. Around one-third of the total population was 
employed in agricultural sector in 2006, whilst service sector was responsible for more than 2/3rd of total 
employment in the EU-27. The proportion of agricultural employment was less significant the CEE 
countries, with the exception of Romania, as Figure 3 illustrates. From these figures, it can be easily 
claimed that Turkish workers are unskilled in their environment because of a large number of agricultural 
workers who are encouraged to stay on the land. It is possible to suggest, in particular, that immigration 
from Turkey to the EU will mostly consist of people from rural areas with low levels of education in the 
event of accession. 
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Figure 3. Employment by sector (2007)
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       According to Choudhry (2005), the high level of urbanization in an economy reflects that 
employed people are more engaged in non-farm activities. Most probably they are working in services or 
industrial sectors which are suppose to be sectors with high labour productivity as compared to 
agriculture sector (high underemployment in agriculture) [21]. In the first place, Turkish industry and 
service sector – that were acquired increasingly dynamism – has been transformed from national to 
international platform in terms of competiveness. Since 1963, the Ankara Association Agreement Turkish 
entrepreneurs who had to comply with the EU’s economic and social polices have prioritised output and 
quality [22].  
      A more optimistic view expressed by Jaeger claimed that the political and economic impact of EU 
convergence would unambiguously be positive, as Turkey would benefit from continued EU-supervised 
reforms, increased economic stability and higher foreign investment flows [23]. Building upon these 
positive moves, bearing in mind that new environment has started for Turkey. After all, the decision in 
October 2005 to open negotiations with Turkey brought blessing in economic sense. An upsurge in 
foreign direct investment inflows was observed in 2006 (See Figure 4).  Such developments may 
generates benefit efficiency and growth, when the Turkish economy continues to be more open in trade 
terms. Here, it can well be assumed that modernization process in Turkey will lead to a declining share of 
agriculture in the economy, and thus agricultural employment. Consequently, immigration of highly 
qualified specialists in some brands of industry will likely emerge.   
Figure 4. Foreign Direct Investment Flows (1995-2006)  
Source: Economic Policy Research Foundation for Turkey e 
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      Experience from the Southern enlargement of the EC indicates that the accession process 
accelerateed transformation. Consequently, the share of agricultural employment in Greece Spain and 
Portugal decreased (see Table 3).  
Table 3. Economic structure before and after EU accession in Greece, Portugal and Spain  
                Before Accession After Accession 
1981 1988  1988 2001  2001 2001 
Greece Portugal Spain Greece Portugal Spain 
Agriculture 31 22 18 18 12 8 
Industry 29 34 32 23 36 31 
Services 40 44 62 63 63 61 
Source: World Development Indicators
      As for Turkey, convergence may have an important implications for future labour flows. 
Theoritically, the migration pressure will typically be diminished due to the growth potential in the long 
or medium term. However, European enterprises will still be attracted by the young Turks because of 
lifestyle’ factors, as they seek better career opportunities in the West.   
      An important element is the incentive for continued economic reform and closer economic 
integration with the EU [24]. Within the EU partnership framework, Turkey is required to take more 
active employment policies, in order to develop lifelong learning and reduce skill gaps. Prospects to join 
the EU are slim if Turkey does not meet the EU targets. It is widely claimed that Turkey has a potential in 
the labour market, which can become fruitfuls, when these reforms are fully implemented. 
4.3 Labour Productivity  
      International comparisons of productivity growth can give useful insights in the growth process. 
More labour in the high total factor productivity location means that the marginal product of capital 
increases. This in turn triggers both accumulation of capital, and an increasing share that the high total 
factor productivity location gets of countrys’ capital stock. The net results are gradual movements of 
population, and gradual increases in capital and output [25]. This is especially so, since many workers in 
mostly old EU member states have long before came out of the traditional agricultural sector, as they 
wanted to be absorbed into the labour market in fields including industry, construction and services. 
      Generally, negative impact of agricultural employment on labour productivity explains the low 
level labour productivity. As an implication of this, evidence from Eurostatistics data suggests that labour 
productivity is lower in Turkey than most of the CEECs, but well above Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania 
and Malta. Obviously, the high share of employment in agriculture is responsible for low level of labour 
productivity in Turkey. In the EU-15 and some the CEE countries, (most notably, the Czech Republic and
Slovenia) the high productivity is due to the high employment in services sector. However, presenting 
Turkey as laggard in respect of lower labour productivity in relation to agriculture would be rather harsh. 
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Turkey is converging towards the EU average. Since 2002, there has been an upward trend at an average 
annual rate of around 3% per person employed. The factors like high level of education and foreign direct 
investment have contributed towards this increasing convergence.  
      Labour costs are an important part of the flexibility of a labour market. If labour costs are too high, 
particularly the low-skilled will be excluded from the labour market. A high minimum wage in relation to 
the median wage is having negative effects on the labour market [26]. As far as growth potential of 
Turkish economy is concern, the focus is on the need to modernise human capital by the means of 
attracting highly skilled migrants for European enterprises.  
     The cost of labour in Turkey is slowing employment growth. There is a significant correlation 
between low-skilled workers and the high-labour costs. When it comes to importing highly skilled 
Turkish migration, there is a fair degree of hump. With the exception for Slovenia, Turkey’s minimum 
wage level was significantly higher than the CEECs in 2007 (see Figure 5). It is reasonable to suggest that 
European enterprises will likely to be reluctant to employ Turkish workers because the employers have to 
pay high labour costs. In the end, the employees will also suffer.  
Figure 5. Monthly gross minimum statutory wage rates in 2007  
Source: Federation of European Employers 
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For the competitive labour market, the IMF as well as the World Bank urgers Tukey to undertake 
reforms of the minimum wage. However, reforms are yet to be introduced for low earners. 
4.4 Human Capital Stock  
      The population ageing and population declining are two realated demographic challenges, which are 
confronting the EU-15 member states. Compared to other countries in the continent their natural 
population balances are among the lowest. The demographic characteristics of CEECs differed 
significantly from those observed in Western part of the continent. However, the situation changed 
dramatically during the transition. Many of the CEECs are among the world’s leaders in fertility decline, 
feature stagnant or decreasing population size and population ageing [27]. The relative weight of the EU-
27’s population fell from 13.3 % of the world total in 1960 to 7.5% by 2005. Europe recorded the largest 
increase across the continents in relation to the old age dependency ratio. During the period of 1960-2005 
age dependency ratio rose from 13.7 % to 23.3 %, which was almost three times the pace of the next 
highest increase, which was recorded in Oceania, where old age dependency increased from 12.2 % to 
15.8 % [28]. 
      What is the current state of play in the European labour markets is that both trends will inhibit the 
ways in which concrete action can not be taken to stimulate European competitivess, as set out by the 
Lisbon Treaty. This “double demographic challenge” will greatly lead to important imbalances in terms 
of social costs of emigration. While arguably the labour shortages are likely to be filled by workers from 
the CEECs as result of joining the EU, there are still doubt over the demographic capacity of these 
countries to support emigration. This point seems well taken because of demographic situation in most 
CEE countries, which will unlikely to meet these expectations.  
      Data from Eurostat statistics shows that Turkey has the largest population among the CEECs (14% 
of the EU-27 total) and followed by Poland (7%). What is more important is that the demographic vitality 
of Turkish migrants within the EU and its potential consequences for European labour mobility. Because 
over a long period of time the demographic factor can in effect contribute to the growth of European 
enterprises ‘both in terms of demand and supply for skilled labour’. A general trend towards a decline of 
working age (15-64 years old) can be detected in Europe. By comparison, Turkey has a young population 
structure, which is illustrated in Table 4. Around 70% (and rising) of the population is of working age 
(15-65 years old). This owns to the high fertility rate (2.2). On average EU fertility can be labelled as 
“low”, while fertility levels in the new member states are around the so-called “lowest low” benchmark. 
Especially in the latter countries, the sustained level of low fertility gives rise to concern of the working 
age from 65% in 2005 to 69% in 2025, but drop by 4% in 2050 
Table 4: Population by age class, 2007 (1) (% of total population)    (1) Euro area and Iceland, 2006 
0 to 14 
years 
15 to 24 
years 
25 to 49 
years 
50 to 64 
years 
65 to 79 
years 
80 years 
and more
EU-27 15.8 12.6 36.3 18.3 12.6 4.3 
Euro area 15.6 11.9 36.8 18.0 13.2 4.5 
Belgium 17.0 12.1 35.3 18.5 12.5 4.6 
Bulgaria 13.4 13.3 35.6 20.4 13.8 3.5 
Czech Rep. 14.4 13.1 36.9 21.2 11.1 3.3 
Denmark 18.6 11.4 34.7 20.0 11.2 4.1 
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Germany 13.9 11.7 36.3 18.4 15.2 4.6 
Estonia 14.9 15.4 34.7 17.9 13.6 3.5 
Ireland 20.3 14.8 38.3 15.5 8.4 2.7 
Greece 14.3 11.6 37.6 18.0 14.7 3.9 
Spain 14.5 11.5 40.5 16.8 12.1 4.5 
France 18.6 12.8 34.2 18.2 11.4 4.8 
Italy 14.1 10.2 37.3 18.4 14.6 5.3 
Cyprus 17.9 15.5 37.3 16.9 9.5 2.8 
Latvia 14.0 15.7 35.6 17.6 13.7 3.4 
Lithuania 15.9 15.7 36.2 16.6 12.5 3.1 
Luxembourg 18.3 11.8 38.8 17.1 10.7 3.3 
Hungary 1502 12.8 35.7 20.4 12.3 3.6 
Malta 16.7 14.2 34.6 20.6 10.8 3.0 
Netherlands 18.1 12.0 36.1 19.4 10.8 3.7 
Austria 15.6 12.3 37.6 17.6 12.4 4.5 
Poland 15.8 15.9 36.0 18.9 10.6 2.9 
Portugal 15.5 11.9 37.4 18.0 13.2 4.1 
Romania 15.4 14.9 37.0 17.8 12.2 2.7 
Slovenia 14.0 12.7 37.8 19.6 12.5 3.4 
Slovakia 16.1 15.6 38.0 18.4 9.3 2.5 
Finland 17.1 12.5 32.9 21.1 12.3 4.2 
Sweden 17.0 12.7 33.2 19.7 12.0 5.4 
United King. 17.6 13.4 35.1 17.9 11.5 4.5 
Croatia 15.6 12.9 35.2 19.2 14.0 3.1 
FYR of Mace. 18.9 16.0 36.9 17.0 9.6 1.6 
Turkey 27.9 17.4 37.5 11.1 - - 
Iceland 21.8 14.6 36.0 15.9 8.6 3.1 
Liechtenstein 17.1 12.3 39.0 19.7 8.9 3.0 
Norway 19.4 12.5 35.5 18.5 10.0 4.7 
Switzerland 15.8 11.9 37.2 18.9 11.6 4.6 
   Source: Eurostat 
       World Bank estimates between 2005 and 2050 suggest that, by the year 2050 the population of 
the West in the working age is expected to have declined from 66% in 2005 inhabitants to 52%, though 
the rate of population growth will be stabilised over time (see Figure 5). As for Turkey, a continuous 
increase trend in the proportion of the working age from 65% in 2005 to 69% in 2025 is observed, but 
population growth rate will drop by almost 4% in 2050. Under the freedom of movement principle, the 
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Turkish community will significantly make up of a younger population, when compared to the EU 
population. 
Figure 6. Share of working age population in total population, World Bank 
estimates 2005-2050 
Source: World Development Indicators
      It should be pointed out that the considerable supply of international migration movements at a 
time was not only the feature of a predominance of workers from rural areas in Turkey, but rapid 
population growth. Demographic dynamics forced the population living in rural areas to move abroad in 
order to take up employment. It is likely that the EU will, in the coming decades, face a significant 
democraphic challenges, which will need to be taken into account within a variety of different policy 
areas. The demographic developments in Turkey are conducive to the employability in the West. A more 
rapid increase in the population of working age compared with the population of the CEECs should help 
innovation capacity of the European enterprises. Here, the “demographic gift” will be a considerable 
factor in integrating Turkish workers into European labour markets in the next few decades. 
      On a more general level, the development of European Citizenship (Article 18 EC) and its 
relationship with the expansion of free movement rights has opened up rights of entry and residence to all 
Community nationals [28]. According to the logic of enlargement, the problem for the population size 
suggests the inclusion of Turkish workers into the European labour markets will be difficult on the basis 
of a magnet for workers from the CEECs to the EU. Demographic trends are key opportunities, but also 
key challenges for Turkish workers. While acknowleding the demographic dinamics of Turkish workes, 
studies repeatedly emphasise the necessity to analyse Turkey’s democraphic situation, as the underlying 
basis for the fact of mass movements. Whatever the debates about the skill composition enlargement 
precludes movement of Turkish workers. 
5.  Conclusion 
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      The EU member states are prepared to extend their search for skills to a global level because the 
means of globalization has modified their human resources strategies. There is now a tendency of 
attracting and exchanging highly skilled labour by the national governments, as they will have little need 
for mass immigration by those with low skill levels. However, the demand of unskilled workers has not 
waned. Instead, the current European labour markets trends suggest that there is a need for low skilled 
workers, especially in agriculture, construction and domestic services. Recognition of this fact is a key 
justification for encouraging Turkish migration flows of unskilled workers. This may involve more 
effective circulation so that the Europan enterprises can become beneficiaries.  
      With regard to the present skill profiles of Turkish workers, it should be noted, that highly - 
qualified workers can transfer their knowledge rather simply and use it in order to successfully promote 
economic growth. It should be kept in mind that a successful development depends on the quality of the 
education system. Athough the quality and level of education in Turkey is modest in comparison to 
European countries, the educational stock is on the rise. European companies being aware of the 
importance of Turkish human capital for knowledge economies may prioritise Turkish workers over other 
third-country nationals. Indeed, the migration of both skilled and unskilled Turkish workers will likely to 
have potentially positive effects on European enterprises. This is truth for less social costs for more 
efficient (international) flow of short distances and better job matches.  
      Competence of human resources is the main factor for the development of knowledge based 
economy. The question of the European single market, therefore speaks to the future role of Turkish 
labour migration in sectoral employment. Abilities and skills are limited, since Turkish labour 
productivity are held back by the highest share of agricultural sector in total employment. In fact, part of 
the increase in skill profiles of Turkish workers over time can be attributed to the boosting foreign direct 
investment. This will in turn lead to the economic transformation, implying exporting highly skilled 
migration to Europe. However, this perception tends to change significantly. As a consequency of labour 
costs due to high minumum wages in Turkey in comparison to the CEECs, European enterprises will 
unlikely employ Turkish workers. 
     Population ageing and decline remains the most dominant demographic challenge in the EU, 
precluding well functioning EU’s internal market. Whereas a very different development of demographic 
structure in the case of Turkey is observed. The emphasis of the adequacy of this human capital shows 
that highly young and dynamic Turkish migrants will likely determine European competitiveness, as they 
can generate important benefits for European labour market. By comparison to early decades of a large 
migration, such characteristics highlight the emergency of quality of Turkish human resources for 
economic growth. The EU is slowly recognising the issue of quality of Turkish human capital in relation 
to migration, and should consider to develope more effective migration policy in the face of democraphic 
challenges. 
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